Britain, Malaysia And Southeast Asia:

Past, Present And Future by Tarling, Nicholas
IJAPS, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 2010) 
 
77 
                                           
BRITAIN, MALAYSIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:  
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE1 
 
Emeritus Professor Nicholas Tarling2 
University of Auckland, New Zealand 
e-mail: n.tarling@auckland.ac.nz 
 
 
I want to thank Asia Pacific Research Unit (APRU), Universiti Sains 
Malaysia (USM) and Professor Ooi Keat Gin for bringing me to Penang 
again. It is always pleasant to be here. It is nearly fifty years since I first 
came, and there have been many changes. There were, of course, no USM, 
no APRU, and only, I fancy, a very small   Ooi Keat Gin. But Penang has a 
respect for its past, and much of what I saw then I can still see. And the past 
goes back to the settlement of Georgetown and the building of Fort 
Cornwallis. Rambling round them a historian finds evocative. Who was 
there before? And why? 
Starting my study of the British in Malaysian history, not quite sixty 
years ago, under the guidance of an old Malayan Civil Service (MCS) hand, 
the late Victor Purcell, I was struck by the fact that I had to use, not only the 
records of the Colonial Office and Foreign Office in London, but also those 
of the East India Company and the India Office, then preserved in the 
Foreign Office itself, and now in the British Library. As the founding of 
Penang itself suggests—and the naming of Fort Cornwallis after a 
Governor-General—the British had India in mind when they came to 
Malaya. They also had China in mind, in particular as the source of tea, 
which had become a fashionable drink in the eighteenth century, and did not 
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then come from India or Sri Lanka. Southeast Asia—and the Malay 
Peninsula—was indeed important to the British chiefly in those contexts, 
scarcely at all for their own sake. Commercially maritime Southeast Asia 
could supply goods that would help to fund the purchase of tea. But much 
more important were the strategic factors: the protection of India and the 
Bay of Bengal; and the security of the route through the Straits to China. 
More important in Britain's overall interests even than those factors were its 
European priorities, the security of Britain itself, the retention of naval 
supremacy, the balance of power that averted the dominance of the 
European Continent by any one state. Rid your mind in thinking of the 
history of British in Southeast Asia or in Malaya of an all-explaining 
imperialism. 
In India, certainly, the British had built an empire, though that had not 
originally been their intention even there. For them, as for other Europeans 
in the seventeenth century, the object was to take part in an Asia-wide trade. 
But rivalry with the French helped to initiate the establishment of a 
territorial realm on the sub-continent in the eighteenth century. And in the 
nineteenth century India was to become the so-called 'jewel in the Crown'. 
Victoria indeed headed what might be thought of as a dual monarchy: in the 
1870s she became Empress as well as Queen. But that did not prompt the 
creation of empire elsewhere. Rather the reverse, in fact: the British 
determined, for example, not to make China 'another India', as The Times 
put it.3 India was a burden as well as a benefit. Britain was a commercial 
state, the first industrial power. That was the source of its strength, and that 
decided its priorities. They did not lie with the further extension of imperial 
rule. 
That self-restraint helped to decide Britain's relationships with 
Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century. It was enforced by political and 
commercial interests elsewhere. In Europe, Britain sought to sustain a 
balance of power. That was an argument for preserving lesser powers, such 
as Spain and the Netherlands, and for compromise with greater powers, such 
as France. Both these requirements could be partly or largely met in 
Southeast Asia. There was no good reason to displace the Spanish rulers of 
the Philippines or the Dutch in Netherlands India. Again, rather the reverse.  
Commercial interests pointed the same way. An India-style policy in 
Southeast Asia would alienate the Chinese empire which had claims over 
the mainland states, and that, it was recognised, would damage the tea trade, 
which, carried on at Canton, was till 1834 a monopoly in the hands of the 
company that ruled India. '[A]ll extension of our territorial possessions and 
                                            
3  N.A. Pelcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign Office (New York: King's Crown, 1948), p. 125. 
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political relations on the side of the Indo-Chinese nations is, with reference 
to the peculiar character of those states, to their decided jealousy of our 
power and ambition, and to their proximity to China, earnestly to be 
deprecated and declined as far as the course of events and the force of 
circumstances will permit', the Governor-General declared in 1824.4 Even 
after the first Anglo-China war of 1840–1842 changed the relationship with 
China, the British sought to avoid open defiance of China's claims. China 
was to be an open market. Challenging its rulers would only encourage 
others to do so too, and perhaps infringe a territorial integrity that was 
advantageous for the most competitive commercial power. 
For these reasons Britain pursued what might be considered a 
minimum policy in Southeast Asia, though it disposed of the power to do far 
more, even perhaps to extend empire over it. India became united, while 
Southeast Asia remained divided. It had little intrinsic interest for the 
British. What was important was protection of the Bay of Bengal and thus 
of the dominion in India and of the route through the Straits of Malacca and 
thus of the trade with China. The founding of Penang was the outcome. 
In considering the concept of imperialism or exploring any 
explanatory power it may offer, you must be struck by the limits on British 
dominion in Southeast Asia rather than by its expanse. Manila, taken indeed 
from the Spaniards during the Seven Years War, was returned to them on its 
conclusion. The Dutch were turned out of their Indonesian settlements in the 
French wars, but returned under the convention of 1814 and the treaty of 
1824, though the latter provided for Britain's acquisition of Melaka and 
Singapore. Britain, it seems clear, would not have intervened in north-west 
Borneo but for the enterprise of the White Raja, and even then it was 
cautious, declining his offer of Sarawak, making a treaty with the sultan of 
Brunei, and acquiring only Labuan as a colony. It did not oppose the French 
occupation of Cochin China after 1859 or the French protectorate of 
Cambodia. Burma was the exception to prove the rule. It was conquered, 
though in three steps, arguably in order to ensure the security of the 
dominion in India.  
It was only in the early twentieth century that Malaya secured a rather 
different priority in British policy. The automobile age made the peninsula a 
rubber-grower and thus a dollar earner and Singapore became the site of a 
great naval base. Even then, of course, other interests were involved: the 
protection of the pound, the defence of India and Australia. In some ways, 
too, the shift in priorities marked an overall decline in Britain's power. The 
                                            
4 Governor-General in Council/Governor-in-Council, 19.11.24. Straits Settlements Factory Records 
G/34/99, India Office Records, British Library.   
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sterling area needed the dollars. The naval base represented an attempt to 
defend two-ocean interests with an one-ocean navy. The Washington 
treaties of 1921–1922 looked to preserve the status quo, but their 
effectiveness depended on the signatories' restraint. When the Japanese 
abandoned them, Britain's inability to defend its interests was exposed. 
Penang was abandoned and Singapore surrendered. 
When the British returned to Southeast Asia, their armies were 
substantially Indian. About 2.5 million Indian soldiers fought for the Allies 
in the Second World War.5 At the end of the war, Britain's Labour 
government wanted to retain a united India in the Commonwealth and 
secure the defence of the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Clement Attlee had 
it in mind "to make it a condition precedent to the grant of Dominion Status 
or independence to India that India should undertake to provide defence 
forces sufficient for her own local defence and in addition assist, in 
Commonwealth or United Nations interests, in the defence of the 'South-
East Asia Area'".6 But in the event Dominion status and then independence 
were coupled with partition.  
'The effect on Army organisation of the granting of self-government 
to India and Pakistan is often overlooked', the Cabinet Defence Committee 
admitted in October 1949. 'For here was a highly trained expandable reserve 
on which we could count in time of emergency or war. While the cost of 
this Army to the United Kingdom in peace was relatively small, it was a 
definite factor in our potential military strength'. As Commonwealth 
members, however, India and Pakistan should, the British considered, 
'accept the obligation' to defend neighbouring territories, 'including the 
possibility that the might entail the employment of some of their forces 
outside their own territory'. The two Dominions 'would have to maintain in 
peacetime defence organisations larger that they would need for their own 
purposes'.7 Britain modified the nature of the Commonwealth so as to retain 
India's membership. But that did not re-acquire the military strength that the 
British had once been able to deploy, nor substitute for it. Moreover, the two 
Dominions were soon at odds. 'It was greatly to our strategic advantage', 
A.V. Alexander noted, 'that these two large countries, with their extensive 
resources in manpower and material, had decided to remain within the 
British Commonwealth'.8 But it was impossible to realise that advantage. 
                                            
5  Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence (London: Pinter; New York: St  Martin's, 1993),                
p. 16. 
6  General Mosley Maine, quoted in Singh, p. 19. 
7  Quoted in ibid., p. 25. 
8  Quoted in ibid., p. 32. 
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Independent India yet played a role in Britain's policy. It was seen as 
a leader and an exemplar for new states. And it was also a factor in the 
Anglo-American relationship. Nehru predicted that 'a large number of 
smaller nations which today are rather helpless will probably look to India 
more than to other countries for a lead in foreign affairs'.9 He did not, 
however, intend to create, alongside the West and the Communists, a third 
bloc. 'India would have an important influence on the development of post-
colonial Asia, since Indian wishes would be a factor there.' But the influence 
was to be exercised 'more through moral guidance than through                   
military power… India's policies of nonalignment and anti-colonialism 
complemented its efforts to become a third great power through diplomacy 
rather than economic or military might'.10 That had political appeal in India. 
It was also realistic.   
To others the foreign policy that Nehru's India adopted often seemed 
unduly moralistic, but it had something in common with Britain's approach 
to the post-colonial world. It should be a world of sovereign states, the 
British believed. Insisting on that would check the ambitions of the super-
powers. And not only the Soviet Union: Britain had no wish to be 
submerged by its relationship with the US. Keeping Indian views before the 
US was a means by which it might itself assert a role. This was particularly 
clear in the case of Southeast Asia. Having helped to persuade the 
Americans to involve themselves in that region, the British also wanted to 
shape US policy, so that it might contain communism without provoking 
conflict. Invoking Indian opinion served the purpose. Indian and British 
attitudes were not, of course, identical. India questioned almost any 
American involvement in the region, rather than seeking and shaping it. The 
British thought India was too anxious to destroy imperialism, too hasty in its 
struggle against colonialism. Its moral tone was not only irritating to others. 
It prevented their fully recognising the threat of communism. Invoking 
Indian reservations might be a way of restraining the Americans, but it 
could as a result be counter-productive. 
Though it had been no easy process, the British saw their decision to 
grant independence on the sub-continent as an act of statesmanship, and as 
an example to the other European colonial powers, France and the 
Netherlands. Imperial Southeast Asia had been divided among colonial 
powers, though under Britain's aegis. In what was now increasingly seen as 
a region – named in Mountbatten's wartime command—the British believed 
they could and should still give a lead. They hoped, as Lord Killearn, the 
                                            
9  Quoted in Wainwright, p. 123. 
10 Ibid., pp. 123–124. 
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Special Commissioner, put it in 1946, that Southeast Asia would be come 'a 
region of peace and orderly progress'.11 The Foreign Secretary, Ernest 
Bevin, wanted to 'bring this great area of South East Asia, impinging upon 
India and Ceylon, out of turmoil'.12   
The colonial powers, allies in Europe, should be restored, but they 
should come to terms with the nationalist movements that challenged them. 
'[I]t is in our over-riding interest to see the establishment of just and stable 
systems of Government wherever possible in the Far East', the Civil 
Planning Unit argued in December 1945. In Southeast Asia it was 'unlikely 
that this objective can be attained without our continuing to play a leading 
part in the settlement of difficulties between the native peoples and our 
Allies'. That was not easily done.13 If dealing the Dutch was difficult, it was 
even harder to press the French, 'notoriously sensitive' to influences from 
outside.14  
The advance of the Cold War made the process more necessary but 
more difficult, especially when Bevin took the initiative in creating the 
Western European Union, which included France and the Netherlands. They 
had pursued a less liberal colonial policy than Britain, Kenneth Christofas 
pointed out. 'There is a great danger that, if our alliance with the other 
Western Powers in Europe were to be correspondingly reflected in our 
behaviour in the East, we should lose the sympathy of the Asiatic peoples 
by whom "Colonialism" and "Imperialism" are considered a far greater 
menace than Communism.'15 Bevin began to look to Commonwealth 
countries in respect to Southeast Asia. Could they help in its pacification? 
he asked at Prime Ministers Conference in October 1948. '[T]here should be 
some regular means of consultation between Commonwealth countries 
interested in that area with the object of helping to put the political and 
economic life of the countries of South-East Asia on a firm footing, based 
upon internal stability and freedom from the menace of Communist 
attack'.16 That was the germ of the Colombo Plan of 1950.  
On the outbreak of the Korean War, Britain endorsed the US position, 
though, burdened by its NATO commitment, it was at first reluctant to send 
ground troops. Interposing the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the 
mainland it found much less acceptable, putting off the chances of accepting 
Communist China, which, like India, it had recognised, into the comity of 
                                            
11 Telegram, 27.6.46, 1097. FO 371/53799 [F9648/1/61], National Archives, Kew. 
12 Minute, n.d. FO 371/53969 [F18076/8/61]. 
13 Draft memorandum, British Foreign policy in the Far East, 31.12.45, in FE (O) (46). CAB 134/280, 
National Archives, Kew. 
14 Minute, 21.12.46. F18076/8/61. 
15 Minute, 27.4.48. FO 371/69689 [F5922/286/61]. 
16 PMM (48) 3rd, 12.10.48. CAB 133/88. 
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nations, and so, it was hoped, encouraging it to behave like a normal state. 
A provocative policy might prompt China to take Hong Kong or intervene 
in Korea or elsewhere. An extended conflict in the Far East might give the 
Russians their opportunity in Europe, and even lead to a general war, in 
which atomic weapons might be used. 
Since the end of the Second World War, Bevin told the Cabinet in 
August 1950, Britain's policy in South and Southeast Asia had been to 
'encourage the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of that area for 
independence'. Supporting nationalism was indeed 'the best possible counter 
to communist subversion and penetration'. The US had seen South and 
Southeast Asia as 'primarily a British interest'. Only during 1949 did it 
become disposed to give Southeast Asia more attention, 'largely owing to 
the Communist threat', and Britain hoped that it would contribute to 
economic development. In the Far East, however, the Americans had 'tended 
to be a law unto themselves': they had not consulted others, and their 
policies seemed to be without a clear direction. India was 'specially worried 
…lest American action should jeopardise the friendly relations which India 
is bent on establishing with China. But the feeling is probably more 
widespread that the United States is intervening in Asia and seeking to 
determine its future in a way unpleasing to the peoples of Asia and likely to 
be to their detriment.' There was a 'distinct possibility' that, unless American 
policy took more account of Asian opinion and susceptibilities, 'we shall 
find that Asia is gradually alienated from the West, which could only be to 
the benefit of the Soviet Union'. Bevin planned to persuade the State 
Department to consult with other powers, especially the Commonwealth and 
France, with the aim of 'reconciling United States and Asian opinion and… 
enabling the Commonwealth to keep in line with the United States'.17  
In the event, of course, the Korean War expanded, and the Chinese 
introduced 'volunteer' troops. The anxiety of the British government 
increased, particularly when it seemed that President Truman contemplated 
the use of atomic weapons. But the conflict was contained in 1951 and truce 
talks begun. In general Britain's policies remained within the framework 
Bevin had set out; even after the labour government was displaced by the 
Conservatives in October 1951. 
The same was true in Southeast Asia itself. In Malaya effective 
measures to deal with the 'Emergency' were adopted even before the 
Conservatives sent out a 'strong man', Sir Gerald Templer, and the military 
measures were the more effective because of the political context, a more 
rapid advance to self-government. In Burma, the British Government stood 
                                            
17 CP (50), 200, 30.8.50. CAB 129/41. 
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by the Rangoon government in the chaos that followed the grant of 
independence in January 1948. It pressed for the withdrawal of the 
Kuomintang (KMT) troops that penetrated Burma from 1950 and urged the 
US to cease its covert support for them.   
The Dutch had recognised Indonesia's independence in 1950, but the 
conflict in Indo-China continued until 1954. Then, of course, the British 
played a leading role at the Geneva conference that brought the first 
Indochina war to an end, though without securing full US endorsement. But, 
while not formally a member of the conference, India played an important 
role. In the Foreign Office records, there is a telegram in which Foreign 
Secretary Eden acknowledged Nehru's congratulations on progress at 
Geneva. Krishna Menon had been 'a real help'.18  
Eden enjoyed another diplomatic victory in 1954, though it was also 
qualified. Getting the US committed in Southeast Asia on the right terms 
had long been a British objective. When the ANZUS treaty was concluded 
in 1951 without its participation, Britain had 'indicated that we hope one day 
it will be possible either to extend the Pacific Pact to cover South East Asia 
or to link up the Pacific Pact with another Pact covering South-East Asia, in 
which the United Kingdom would be a direct participant through her 
responsibility for the defence of Malaya'.19 But the US wanted to be 'left 
free to pursue their own military policies in the Far East without any 
international intervention'.20  
The new Eisenhower Administration gave Eden an opportunity in 
March 1954. As part of its attempts to keep the French fighting, Secretary of 
State Dulles called on 29 March 1954 for 'united action'. The Americans had 
in mind, as Eisenhower put it to Churchill, 'the establishment of a new Ad 
Hoc grouping or coalition composed of nations which have a vital concern 
in the checking of Communist expansion in the area'.21 The proposal was 
welcome, Eden told the Cabinet, but only after the Geneva conference. That 
would be the time, as a meeting at the FO decided, to pursue the proposal 
for collective defence. The arrangement, Eden insisted, should be framed, so 
far as possible, to secure Asian participation. Certainly, as he told Dulles, 
India should not be alienated.22  
This was the origin of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO) treaty, concluded in Manila a few weeks after Geneva. Though it 
                                            
18 Telegram, 22.6.54, 1065 FO 371/112074 [DF 1071/42]. 
19 Minute, 3.5.51. FO 371/93028 [FZ1071/1]. 
20 N. Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Impact of the Korean War (Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, 2005), p. 200. 
21 In Aldrich/Churchill, 5.4.54. PREM 11/645, National Archives. 
22 Tarling, pp. 312–314, 319–320. 
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is often regarded as an American initiative, it was not concluded in the 
context in which Dulles had proposed it, nor was it what he wanted. The US 
COS had no enthusiasm for it, and was opposed to the creation of any 
permanent machinery.  It involved, as Dulles himself put it, 'committing the 
prestige of the United States in an area where we had little control and 
where the situation was by no means promising'.23 The diplomatic successes 
Eden enjoyed in 1954 were incomplete, though remarkable. Not only was 
the US half-hearted over the long-sought Southeast Asia defence treaty: 
only two Southeast Asian states joined, and, despite Eden's efforts, it met 
India's disapproval, especially given Pakistan's participation. 
Later in the 1950s the British became anxious lest US intervention in 
Laos should lead to a larger war. The contribution of the US to 'the 
realisation of Western aims in Eastern Asia' was 'incomparably greater' than 
that of any other country. That was 'wholly to our interest', but there were 
frequent occasions on which Britain would wish to influence American 
policy', the Cabinet Committee on Future policy argued in November 1960. 
SEATO represented 'the first and only American commitment to the defence 
of the mainland of South and South East Asia', and it should not be 
weakened. A move towards accepting 'leftish neutralist governments' in 
Laos as well as Cambodia might reduce 'our responsibilities and 
obligations', but it would be 'almost impossible to carry the Americans with 
us'. The Americans, the Committee concluded, 'might not listen to our 
advice at all unless we had firstly a military presence in the area … and 
secondly facilities in Singapore.'24  
Britain took a leading role in a new Geneva conference in 1961–1962, 
which, thanks also to a change of policy by the new Kennedy 
administration, as well as the attitude of the Soviet Union (SU), agreed on 
the neutralisation of Laos. That was coupled with increased support for the 
increasingly embattled regime in South Vietnam. There the British tendered 
their support, but in a limited way, more limited, perhaps, that Peter Busch 
suggests. Their answer was the Thompson mission, designed to apply to 
South Vietnam the lessons of the campaign against Communist subversion 
in Malaya after 1948. An advisory mission, argued Lord Home, the Foreign 
Secretary, 'would hearten the Vietnamese and please the Americans, fulfil 
our SEATO obligations and to that extent encourage the Thais and 
Filipinos, as well as commending itself to the Malayans, Australians and 
New Zealanders. Above all it might just tip the balance against a very 
                                            
23 Conversation, 17.8.54. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, XII, p. 735. 
24 DSE (60) 30 (Final), 3.11.60. CAB 134/1645, National Archives, Kew. 
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expensive war in which we should all get involved'.25  It was, once more, an 
involvement to limit involvement.  
In 1963 the Foreign Office's South East Asia Department considered 
the 'upper arc' of Southeast Asia 'peripheral to our interests as a whole'. The 
UK's objects there were '(i) to contain Communist expansion outside the 
range of our vital interests further south; (ii) to keep in touch with the 
Americans, so that we can influence their policy and provide them with a 
local illustration of the value of our alliance; (iii) to prevent Australia, New 
Zealand and now Malaysia from believing that we have abandoned them'.26 
The British indeed argued that they were committed to the confrontation 
struggle and that there was thus a division of labour with the Americans. 
Home, now Prime Minister, agreed to support American policy in Vietnam 
in return for President Johnson's support for the 'peaceful national 
independence of Malaysia'.27 But when confrontation ended, no British 
forces were sent to Vietnam.28 
Britain's interests in the 'lower arc' were deeper, but they had also 
come into in question. A Foreign Office memorandum of September 1964 
pointed to the decline in Britain's material interests in Southeast Asia, where 
it now did only 3% of its world trade, and where Malaysia no longer 
brought a net balance of foreign exchange to the sterling area but was in 
deficit. Why did it therefore still sustain at Singapore its largest overseas 
military base? 
The reasons were political. The first was 'that the whole area should 
not slide progressively into a vassal relationship with China and 
subsequently into communism'. In whatever way the relations of the PRC 
and SU developed, 'it must remain a major British interest to prevent the 
decisive change in the balance of world power that would result from the 
absorption of 230 million people into the Communist system'. That would 
have an impact on India and Japan, on Australia and New Zealand, and 
above all on the US and its prestige. The impact would be 'particularly 
damaging' to Britain if American opinion were able to attribute Communist 
success in a major degree to Britain's failing in its 'responsibilities'. The 
second major reason for playing a role in Southeast Asia was indeed 'to 
contribute effectively to the global Anglo-American partnership and to 
maintain that influence in the shaping of United States policies that is 
cardinal to the conduct of our whole foreign policy'. A war started in 
                                            
25 Quoted in Peter Busch, All the Way with JFK? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 73, 89. 
26 Warner/Marsahll, 20.9.63. FO 371/169688 [D 1051/37]. 
27 Quoted in Easter, p. 83. 
28 Geraint Hughes, Harold Wilson's Cold War (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2009), p. 62. 
86 
IJAPS, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 2010)  Britain, Malaysia and Southeast Asia 
Southeast Asia could ultimately imperil the UK. A military presence there 
was valuable while it enabled Britain to influence US policies. 
In the longer term, the memorandum argued, the peace and stability 
of Southeast Asia required a modus vivendi, 'declared or tacit, between the 
West and the major Communist powers, but especially China'. The aim 
should be a neutralised Southeast Asia 'allowed to pursue its own destinies 
without outside interference or commitment'. SEATO would be disbanded. 
Western military bases only drove nationalism into partnership with 
communism. Nationalism was 'still the dominant political emotion' in the 
region, and such a partnership was bound to damage the anti-Communist 
cause. 'It is also unnatural, in that national particularism—and, in its 
negative form, anti-Chinese sentiment—is at present the one force that may 
be able to inhibit the spread of Communist beliefs in the area and to enable 
an agreed system of neutrality to be established'.  
The policy was, however, long-term. Confrontation would have to be 
ended before the defence treaty with Malaysia was terminated. SEATO 
would remain 'a necessary short-term symbol of Western resolution in 
South-East Asia. To seek to jettison it too soon would outrage the 
Americans and expose the area to demoralisation in the face of the threat of 
Communist advance from North Vietnam or China.' That threat had to be 
contained long enough to convince China that the West could not be beaten 
militarily or by subversion 'without unacceptable effort on the Communist 
part', and that neutralisation was preferable.29  
For the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Jim Callaghan, the long-term 
was too long-term: 'we cannot afford to behave as we did when we were a 
wealthy imperial power … and there is no real economic gain from that part 
of the world. That being so, our obligations go as far as, but no further than, 
our duty as good citizens of the world—but we cannot carry that out at the 
risk of bankrupting ourselves. … Singapore and South East Asia represent a 
substantial cost and therefore there must be constant pressure to reduce 
expenditure in that part of the world.' If Britain had to wait until 
'neutralisation' became possible, it would 'endanger a genuine attempt to live 
within our means'.30 It was not surprising that, after confrontation ended, the 
UK set a date for leaving Singapore.  
The end of confrontation led to the creation of ASEAN in 1967. The 
association would accommodate Indonesia's justifiable claim to some kind 
of regional influence while avoiding the need to rely on outside powers for 
defence against it. With the British withdrawing, and the Americans clearly 
                                            
29 DO (O) (64) 59, 22.9.64. CAB 148/7. 
30 Callaghan/Gordon Walker, 1.1.65. FO 371/180205 [D1051/7]. 
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not going to stay in Vietnam, an association of Southeast Asian nations, 
agreeing to avoid disputes among themselves, would also provide greater 
security over against the People's Republic of China (PRC). Association was 
in a sense a substitute for the intervention of outside powers who had played 
so large a role in Southeast Asia's past.  
It was entirely welcome to the British. The idea that independent 
states might draw together to provide greater security was compatible with 
Britain's longstanding concept of a world of nations as well as with its wish 
to diminish their burdens as a provider of security. The idea of a closer 
association that the Tunku put forward in 1959 the departments in London 
considered 'commendable'. He was 'reviving a solution to the political 
problems of the area which in general we favour.'31 The British offered 
discreet support in the subsequent phases. They were also supportive when 
Malaysia and Thailand moved on in the Kuala Lumpur declaration of 1971 
to advance the idea of neutralising Southeast Asia. 'The aspiration is that at 
some time in the future the association will extend to include the other five 
Southeast Asian countries', wrote Sir J. Johnston, High Commissioner in 
Kuala Lumpur: 'and that together the ten will form an area of “peace, 
freedom and stability” collectively persuading the super powers to remain at 
a political equidistance which none singly could hope to achieve.'32 With 
that, Britain recognised that it no longer had a strategic role in Southeast 
Asia. Had India? 
Britain had seen India as an influence and exemplar. That it was no 
longer. Its international prestige had been damaged by its own military 
action in occupying Portuguese Goa in December 1961.33 Its humiliating 
defeat at the hands of China—inflicted at the height of the US-SU Cuba 
crisis in retaliation for its 'forward policy' on the frontier—followed in 1962. 
'Most of the Afro-Asian neutralists, whose cause Nehru had championed for 
so long and so eloquently, were awed by China's demonstration of power. 
They stood mutely neutral instead of rallying to the Indian side, as India 
expected them to do'.34 If Nehru had undermined his own principles over 
Goa, their basis was now overthrown. At the same time China developed its 
relationship with Pakistan. Under such conditions India's capacity for 
influencing Southeast Asia could only diminish. 
 
                                            
31 Curwen/Williams, 13.3.59. DO 35/9913 [34], National Archives. 
32 Regionalism and Nationalism, Notes for Opening Remarks, ?15.10.73. FCO 24/1530 [59], National 
Archives. 
33 Harish Kapur, India's Foreign Policy, 1947–92 (New Delhi: Thousand Oaks; London: Sage, 1994),             
p. 131. 
34 Ibid., p. 132. 
88 
IJAPS, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 2010)  Britain, Malaysia and Southeast Asia 
The British were disappointed. 'The desirability of getting India to 
take more interest in South East Asia and the hope that this might ultimately 
lead to the assumption by India of at least part of the remaining British 
responsibility in that region has been one of the dominant concepts in the 
British approach to South East Asia ever since 1947,' a Foreign Office 
memorandum observed in 1964. But the obstacles had been formidable. 
Indians were not popular in Southeast Asia. Their commercial, money-
lending and middleman activities attracted 'popular odium'. At the 
government level, Nehru and his representatives had become more and more 
'patronising'. The 'undercurrent of resentment' that caused did not much 
matter as long as Southeast Asian governments were 'impressed by India's 
potential strength and actual international influence'. That influence was 
sustained for most of the 1950s. But by the end of the decade, 'Indian 
ascendancy in Southeast Asia was already being imperilled by the growing 
strength and influence of China', especially in Burma and Indonesia, and its 
economic difficulties not only prevented its offering mutual assistance but 
also cast doubt on its ability to offer a non-Communist path to progress. The 
decline in influence was 'brutally accelerated by her humiliating defeat at 
the hands of the Chinese in November 1962,' which had 'profound 
repercussions' in Southeast Asia.35   
Nehru did not want to abandon the policy of non-alignment, and his 
successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, stayed with it.36 Under Mrs Gandhi and her 
son, however, India gradually gave up its 'grandiose plans for world 
peace'.37 Its focus in the next two decades was sub-continental, South Asian. 
One object was to reduce the opportunities open to China there. 'Much of 
Indian diplomacy is…geared to the task of monitoring Chinese presence in 
the region, competing with her northern neighbour in the area, and eroding 
her influence wherever possible,'38 in Nepal, for example.  It went to war 
with Pakistan more than once. In the early 1970s, reassured by a friendship 
treaty with China's rival, the SU, it helped to create Bangladesh. In the 
1980s it intervened in Sri Lanka. In the eyes of Sunanda K. Dutta-Ray it 
developed 'an Indian variant of the Monroe Doctrine', and it was 
characterised as a 'regional bully'.39 SAARC, established in 1985, was slow 
to develop, given India's poor relations with other members and its 
comparative 'giantism'.40  
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Outside the sub-continent it played a far smaller role, though one 
affected more than ever by its concern over China. China initially 
condemned ASEAN. Unsurprisingly India initially supported it. Indeed, 
before it was set up in August 1967, India had indicated that it would be 
ready to join the association. Visiting Singapore in May, M.C. Chagla, the 
Foreign Minister, declared: 'We will be very happy to have bilateral 
arrangements with Singapore, with regard to trade, commerce, and 
economic cooperation. But if Singapore chooses to join any regional 
cooperation, we will be happy to join such a grouping, if other members 
want India to do so. If others want to have a small grouping, India will be 
very happy to remain outside and help such a grouping … India does not 
want to dominate any regional grouping'.41 
For a while, however, India proved somewhat ambivalent about an 
organisation that included Thailand and the Philippines, members, along 
with Pakistan, of the SEATO alliance. For its part ASEAN found the 
dismemberment of Pakistan disconcerting, and felt that India was 
facilitating the intrusion of the SU into the Indian Ocean.42 India, it noted, 
failed to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which it viewed, in 
the context of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, in 'the most ominous 
terms'.43 The Kuala Lumpur (KL) declaration and the disbanding of SEATO 
cleared away some of the obstacles in face of a more positive relationship, 
but others remained.  
The sending of Indian troops to Sri Lanka in 1987 and to the 
Maldives in 1988 tainted India's image.44 There was also concern over the 
warnings India issued to Fiji about the treatment of the Indians there.45 The 
expansion of the Indian Navy, and reports that it would build a base at Great 
Nicobar, also worried the maritime members of ASEAN. Port Blair began to 
be seen not only as a 'stopper' of the Straits of Malacca, but also a 
'springboard' into the Straits and even the South China Sea. 'India must 
show to its neighbours, including Malaysia and other countries in Southeast 
Asia, that it does not have any ambitions to interfere in regional affairs,' said 
Ahmad Rithauddeen, Malaysia's Deputy Defence Minister, in 1990. He 
'hoped that New Delhi would not go to the extent of flexing its military 
muscle beyond the Indian Ocean or attempt to control the gateway of the 
Straits of Malacca'.46 
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The collapse of the SU and the weakening of India's economic 
position in the early 1990s helped to transform the situation. ASEAN took 
account of the 'rise' of China, and so did India. It became a sectoral dialogue 
partner of the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF] in 1993, a full dialogue 
partner in 1995, a member, along with China, in 1996. It also forged 
bilateral defence links with ASEAN countries. But, as Daljit Singh 
suggested, India was 'effectively contained geopolitically' in South Asia by 
Pakistan and China, and it would need a dynamic economy and a resolution 
of the Kashmir dispute to break out of that impasse.47 Whether its doing so 
would benefit ASEAN Mak Joon Num has doubted. Introducing a counter-
vailing force in Southeast Asia might provoke an arms race with China.48 
Strategic interests were most responsible for Britain's interest in 
Southeast Asia throughout the period. In the nineteenth century the British 
were concerned about the protection of India, the route to China, the balance 
of power in Europe. In the first half of the twentieth century, they had an 
economic interest in Malaya, but their main concern was with Singapore, 
and its role in the relationship with India and Australia. After the Pacific 
War, they saw Southeast Asia as a region in which nation-states would 
counter communism. They sought the involvement of the US, and also 
sought to demonstrate their value to it more generally, and so to influence 
its policy against another international war. But they also sought to regulate 
it through their relationship with India. The results of that had disappointed 
them. But with the diminution of Britain's role—now that of a 'normal' 
trading power, though also with the peculiar advantage of originating the 
world lingua franca—the question of India's role emerged in a new context. 
That context includes the creation of China's 'ring of pearls'. What role will 
India now play? How will it affect Malaysia? Can Malaysia's well-practised 
regional diplomacy affect it? 
No more than its British Indian predecessor could independent India 
tolerate a challenge on the sub-continent itself, and both were also 
concerned with the security of Burma.  
There again the main concern in this phase was with China. The 
isolation Burma adopted under Ne Win was reduced in the 1980s and India's 
contacts began to revive, Rajiv Gandhi visiting early in 1988.49 That cannot 
be considered apart from the changes in China's policy, its rapprochement 
with the US, its adoption of the four modernisations, its attempts to improve 
relations with the SU, and its bullying of Vietnam in the South China Sea. 
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The concerns about China 'led to an increase in India's interest in Southeast 
Asia, with the objective of finding complementarity of interests with 
countries of the region in an attempt, among other things, to contain the 
likely growth of Chinese influence and reach in Southeast Asia', as Ayoob 
puts it. An increase in China's influence there could possibly embolden it to 
challenge India 'on the latter's doorsteps in South Asia,' Nepal and Bhutan, 
or gang up with Pakistan to teach India a 'lesson'.50 But Burma, on a frontier 
now troubled by tribal insurgency, had a special importance.  
Seeking to retain power the military regime needed foreign exchange 
and assistance in suppressing ethnic insurgency. The State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC) junta looked to post-Tiananmen China, and 
'began Burma's slide into China's embrace'.51 With that it abandoned both 
the isolationism of the Ne Win regime and a much longer tradition of 
dealing only at arm's length with its great neighbour. It also alarmed India. 
Whether China's motives were economic or strategic, its influence in Burma 
and its interest in naval facilities in the Bay of Bengal added another 
dimension to India's policy towards Southeast Asia.52 India's concern led it 
in 1994 to abandon its policy of isolating the military regime and supporting 
the anti-SLORC opposition. Belatedly it lent its support to the 'constructive 
engagement' policy that ASEAN had adopted in 1991.53 But the policy did 
not succeed in weaning the junta from China, still less in securing a change 
in the political situation. In 2000 Maung Aye visited New Delhi and in 2001 
Jaswant Singh visited what was now called Myanmar.54 Tan Shwe visited 
India in 2004, President Abdul Kalam visited Burma in 2006.55 There were 
attempts to reactivate security dialogue on the frontier and India offered 
Burma infrastructural assistance.56 But this hardly countered the 
unprecedented position China acquired, extending even to acquiring access 
to three islands on the shores of the Indian Ocean.57 In 2005 India decided 
to establish its Far East Naval command at Port Blair in the Andamans.58  
                                           
'We shall increasingly become a European power,' the Cabinet 
Defence Committee said in 1967; 'and our international influence will 
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depend more and more on the soundness of our economy, rather than on our 
maintenance of a military presence in the rest of the world'.59  The 
resolution of the confrontation struggle and the creation of ASEAN meant 
that, by the early 1970s, Britain's commitments had been reduced to a 
residual commitment to the Five-Power Defence Arrangement concluded by 
the Heath Government in April 1971. In 1977 it defined its priorities with 
respect to the ASEAN countries: '(a) To expand our exports and protect our 
investments; (b) To ensure that the governments of the five members of 
ASEAN remain well-disposed towards the UK and the west generally;               
(c) To help governments to consolidate internally while improving their 
human rights performance.' It added: 'Now that the United Kingdom is no 
longer an imperial power with strategic interests to protect, regional 
countries are more inclined to regard our assistance and advice as relatively 
disinterested'.60  
It was indeed strategic interests that were most responsible for 
Britain's interest in Southeast Asia throughout the period. In the nineteenth 
century the British were concerned about the protection of India, the route to 
China, the balance of power in Europe. In the first half of the twentieth 
century, they had an economic interest in Malaya, but their main concern 
was with Singapore, and its role in the relationship with India and Australia. 
After the Pacific War, they saw Southeast Asia as a region in which nation-
states would counter communism. They sought the involvement of the US, 
and also sought to demonstrate their value to it more generally, and so to 
influence its policy against another international war.  
The ending of confrontation and the creation of ASEAN meant that, 
by the early 1970s, Britain's commitments had been reduced to a residual 
commitment to the Five-Power Defence Arrangement concluded by the 
Heath Government in April 1971. In 1977 it defined its priorities with 
respect to the ASEAN countries: '(a) To expand our exports and protect our 
investments; (b) To ensure that the Governments of the five members of 
ASEAN remain well-disposed towards the United Kingdom and the West 
generally; (c) To help governments to consolidate internally while 
improving their human rights performance.' It added: 'Now that the United 
Kingdom is no longer an imperial power with strategic interests to protect, 
regional countries are more inclined to regard our assistance and advice as 
relatively disinterested'. (Memo, British Policy towards the Countries of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations, 4.11.77 FCO24/2340 [30]). 
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